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Abstract
This paper develops a model of central-bank intervention based upon a policy characteristic of foreign-
exchange interventions by the United States, Germany, and Japan in the late 1980's and evaluates it
empirically. Central bankers intervene with greater intensity as rates deviate from target levels, but they also
try to stabilize rates around current levels. The model is estimated using exchange rates and data based upon
observed central-bank interventions. Interestingly, the estimates of the model are consistent with the
predictions of the theoretical model for both the deutsche-mark/dollar rate and, less strongly, for the yen/
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 Occasional Interventions to Target Rates
 By KAREN K. LEWIS*
 This paper develops a model of central-bank intervention based upon a policy
 characteristic of foreign-exchange interventions by the United States, Germany,
 and Japan in the late 1980's and evaluates it empirically. Central bankers
 intervene with greater intensity as rates deviate from target levels, but they also try
 to stabilize rates around current levels. The model is estimated using exchange
 rates and data based upon observed central-bank interventions. Interestingly, the
 estimates of the model are consistent with the predictions of the theoretical model
 for both the deutsche-mark / dollar rate and, less strongly, for the yen / dollar
 rate. (JEL F41, G15, F31)
 Governments frequently target macroeco-
 nomic variables through a mixed policy of
 occasional interventions with otherwise
 floating rates. This type of policy has been
 particularly characteristic of foreign-
 exchange market intervention since the end
 of the Bretton Woods system. Within this
 period, the "Louvre Accord" intervention
 policy following the summit meeting in
 February 1987 stands out as the most ambi-
 tious attempt to implement a system of co-
 ordinated central-bank intervention by the
 United States and its trading partners. As
 such, this policy provides a useful bench-
 mark for considering the effects of interven-
 tion policies over other floating-rate periods
 and, possibly, other markets, as well.
 In this paper, I investigate the relation-
 ship between occasional interventions and
 the behavior of rates, focusing upon the
 Louvre period. I first show theoretically how
 this type of intervention policy affects the
 behavior of the exchange rate. A unique
 feature of this model is that the behavior of
 the exchange rate depends directly upon the
 probability of intervention. I estimate this
 probability of intervention and the model of
 exchange-rate behavior. The basic theoreti-
 cal predictions hold for the DM/$ ex-
 change rate and, less strongly, for the yen/$
 exchange rate.
 The implications of the model are quite
 intuitive. The Louvre intervention policy set
 targeted levels for the DM/$ and yen/$
 exchange rates. As exchange rates deviated
 from these levels, the Group of Three (G-3)
 central banks were supposed to intervene to
 push rates back toward their targeted levels.1
 Since traders were aware of the central
 bankers' intentions, they expected move-
 ments in the exchange rate away from tar-
 geted levels to be offset with increasing
 likelihood as rates drifted from the target.
 Thus, one implication of the model is that
 the intensity of intervention induces ex-
 pected reversion to target levels in the
 * Department of Finance, The Wharton School, 2300
 SH-DH, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA
 19104-6367. I am grateful for helpful suggestions from
 two anonymous referees, Giuseppe Bertola, William
 Cleveland, Francisco Delgado, Frank Diebold, Avinash
 Dixit, Bernard Dumas, Bob Flood, Ken Froot, Peter
 Garber, Michael Klein, Paul Krugman, Maury Obstfeld,
 Paolo Pesenti, Andy Rose, Lars Svensson, and from
 seminar participants at Brown University, the Univer-
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 Monetary Fund, the NBER Summer Institute, Prince-
 ton University, and Yale University. I am also grateful
 for research support from the Olin Foundation and the
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 Of course, any errors are mine alone.
 1The Group of Three (G-3) are the United States,
 Germany, and Japan. Although other industrialized
 countries at the summit also agreed upon the Louvre
 Accord, most of the intervention was carried out by
 these three countries.
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 determinants of rates and, therefore, the
 rates themselves. While this type of mean-
 reversion has previously only been posited,
 this model shows how the reversion de-
 pends directly upon parameters in the inter-
 vention policy.2 The empirical evidence in-
 deed finds that the conditional mean of the
 exchange rate depends upon the probability
 of intervention.
 A second feature of the intervention be-
 havior comes from its stabilizing role. Al-
 though the central banks intervened with
 greater intensity as exchange rates deviated
 from their targeted levels, the interventions
 appeared to stabilize rates around current
 levels. As a result, the model predicts that
 the conditional variance of the fundamental
 variables, and hence of the exchange rate
 itself, declines as the exchange rate deviates
 from its targeted level. This conditional-
 variance behavior depends upon the inter-
 vention probability, a relationship that I also
 find empirically below.
 An alternative description of intervention
 policy over this period is that central bankers
 maintained the exchange rate within a given
 band around the targeted levels. Paul
 Krugman (1991) has shown that if central
 banks intervene with certainty at given
 exchange-rate bands and if the market rec-
 ognizes this policy, expectations of these
 interventions will induce nonlinearities in
 the relationship between the exchange rate
 and its fundamental determinants. As shown
 by Lars Svensson (1991), this target-zone
 model also implies that the conditional vari-
 ance of the exchange rate will decline as the
 exchange rate nears the-bands. Thus, a find-
 ing that the conditional variance falls as the
 exchange deviates from its target as implied
 by the intervention model is also consistent
 with the Krugman target-zone model.
 To consider whether target bands are im-
 portant over this period, I conduct tests of
 nonlinearities in the exchange rate and fun-
 damentals relationship. Based upon these
 tests, I do not find any evidence against
 linearity despite using quite different mea-
 sures of fundamental variables. To check
 whether the lack of evidence for nonlineari-
 ties is due to low power of the tests, I
 estimate the model parametrically and then
 use this model as a data-generating process
 to conduct Monte Carlo experiments of the
 test statistics. These experiments show that
 nonlinearities induced by targeted bands
 should have been picked up easily by the
 tests. In other words, the tests are quite
 powerful against this alternative. Thus, tar-
 get bands do not appear to explain the
 results.
 In the absence of target bands, however,
 the intervention policy itself implies that the
 exchange rate remains a nonlinear function
 of its fundamental determinants, raising the
 question of why these nonlinearities are not
 detected. Therefore, I conduct another set
 of Monte Carlo experiments based on the
 parametric model, but without imposing tar-
 get bands. The experiments show that the
 relationship implied by the intervention
 model is sufficiently linear that the test
 statistics are likely to be unable to detect
 them.
 Section I below presents the basic theo-
 retical framework. Section II provides the
 empirical evidence. Section III shows how
 the occasional intervention model differs
 from other models such as the Krugman
 model. Concluding remarks follow.
 I. Interventions and the Behavior of Rates
 To provide a framework for the investiga-
 tion, I will begin with a standard asset pric-
 ing relationship. Specifically, the asset price
 depends both upon a set of fundamental
 variables that influence its contemporane-
 ous demand and supply and upon the ex-
 pected future asset price. This relationship
 is given by
 (1) x(t) = f(t) + aEtf dx(t)} /dt
 where x is the logarithm of the asset price,
 f is a composite variable of the determi-
 nants of the price, a parameterizes the
 sensitivity of the asset price to its own ex-
 pected future change, dx is the change in
 2Kenneth Froot and Maurice Obstfeld (1991) and
 Francisco Delgado and Bernard Dumas (1992) assume
 that fundamentals follow a mean-revertin'g Ornstein-
 Uhlenbeck (OU) process.
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 the price over the interval of time, and dt is
 the interval of time. For this equation to
 explain the exchange rate, x is defined as
 the logarithm of the foreign-currency price
 of a unit of domestic currency and f is a
 measure of its fundamental determinants.3
 Since equation (1) represents a first-order
 differential equation in x, the exchange rate
 can be solved in terms of fundamentals given
 the process followed by fundamentals. A
 standard assumption is that these funda-
 mentals evolve according to a random walk,
 possibly with drift. I will use this assumption
 both to show how intervention will alter the
 behavior of the standard fundamentals pro-
 cess and to contrast the intervention model
 with conventional ones. This process is
 (2) df = ,dt +(dz
 where df f(t) - f(t - dt), ,u is a constant
 drift term, and dz = z(t) - z(t - dt), where
 z(t) is a random variable with increments
 over the interval dt that are independent
 and normally distributed with zero mean
 and unit variance. To understand how inter-
 vention during the late 1980's would affect a
 fundamentals process such as (2), I will first
 describe this policy and then return to the
 issue of solving the model.
 A. G-3 Intervention Policy
 and Exchange Rates: The Evidence
 In 1985, the United States resumed for-
 eign-exchange intervention after a hiatus of
 five years covering the first Reagan adminis-
 tration. Figure 1 depicts the DM/dollar
 and the yen/dollar exchange rates for the
 period 1985-1987. To investigate the rela-
 tionship between the exchange rates and
 intervention over this period, these ex-
 change-rate series were combined with se-
 ries identifying days when foreign-exchange
 traders observed one of the G-3 central
 banks intervening. Intervention accounts
 were also divided into dollar sales intended
 to weaken the dollar and dollar purchases
 to support the dollar. The intervention se-
 ries were compiled for this study from daily
 newspaper accounts from The New York
 Times, Wall Street Journal, and the London
 Financial Times.4 The daily exchange-rate
 data are reported by the Bank of England
 as collected by the International Monetary
 Fund. These rates are quoted in London at
 7:00 A.M. EST and are therefore observed
 before the opening of the U.S. markets.
 The figure illustrates the three periods of
 intervention policy described by Kathryn
 Dominguez (1990). The first period began
 following a meeting of the G-5 countries at
 the "Plaza Meeting" in September 1985
 where the governments announced that a
 fall in the value of the dollar was desirable.
 Subsequently, the dollar declined dramati-
 cally against both the deutsche mark and
 the Japanese yen. The second period began
 with the Tokyo meeting on May 5, 1986, in
 which Japanese officials were concerned
 that the yen might strengthen too much. By
 February 1987, the beginning of the third
 intervention period, official concerns about
 the weakness of the dollar led to the Louvre
 Accord, an agreement among central banks
 to stabilize exchange rates. Yoichi
 Funabashi (1989) reports the target levels
 immediately following the Louvre as DM
 1.825/dollar and as Y153.5/dollar. The
 yen/dollar rate was later rebased to
 Y146/dollar. During the months following
 the Louvre accord, exchange rates appeared
 to be quite stable relative to the previous
 two years. The upper right-hand panel of
 Figure 1 shows this period in more detail,
 including the midpoint of the yen/dollar
 targets of Y149.8/dollar.
 Table 1 describes summary statistics of
 interventions by the Federal Reserve, the
 3In standard exchange-rate models, f(t) is the com-
 bination of factors that determine the flow supply
 relative to demand for foreign exchange. In monetary
 models, such as Michael Mussa (1982), a is the semi-
 elasticity of money demand.
 4The exchange rate is determined by the private
 market demand based upon currently available infor-
 mation. Since the market does not perfectly observe
 the magnitudes of intervention, these data and not
 actual intervention data are appropriate for the study.
 See also footnote 6.
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 FIGURE 1. DOLLAR EXCHANGE RATES AND G-3 INTERVENTION
 TABLE 1-G-3 INTERVENTION, SUMMARY STATISTICS
 Average level Average level Average level at
 Proportion of total Average level at intervention at dollar sales dollar purchases
 Period and bank days intervened DM Yen DM Yen DM Yen DM Yen
 Total period (532 observations, 9/23/85-12/31/87):
 Federal Reserve 0.077 2.02 162.5 2.36 194.1 1.79 141.5
 Bundesbank 0.152 2.08 166.6 2.43 197.2 1.86 146.8
 Bank of Japan 0.217 2.03 159.6 2.66 216.8 1.94 150.8
 Combined 0.304 2.06 162.9 2.04 161.3 2.40 194.9 1.94 151.2
 Plaza to Tokyo (157 observations, 9/23/85 - 5/4/86):
 Federal Reserve 0.070 2.63 215.4 2.67 220.1 2.17 168.5
 Bundesbank 0.178 2.60 211.3 2.65 215.5 2.33 184.8
 Bank of Japan 0.172 2.50 201.2 2.65 216.7 2.25 175.0
 Combined 0.255 2.45 195.5 2.53 203.4 2.64 215.3 2.28 178.6
 Tokyo to Louvre (205 observations, 5/5/86 - 2/20/87):
 Federal Reserve 0.101 2.03 159.8 - - 2.03 159.8
 Bundesbank 0.087 1.99 155.9 2.05 154.0 1.98 156.0
 Bank of Japan 0.204 2.11 160.8 - - 2.11 160.8
 Combined 0.272 2.05 159.1 2.08 159.5 2.05 154.0 2.08 159.6
 Louvre to crash (169 observations, 2/22/87-10/18/87):
 Federal Reserve 0.124 1.83 146.6 1.87 151.4 1.81 144.3
 Bundesbank 0.148 1.82 144.8 1.85 148.7 1.80 142.5
 Bank of Japan 0.219 1.81 143.5 - - 1.81 143.5
 Combined 0.314 1.82 146.0 1.82 144.9 1.85 149.4 1.81 143.6
 Notes: The spot exchange rates are the DM/$ and yen/$ rates from the International Monetary Fund observed in London
 at 7:00 A.M. Eastern Standard Time. The intervention data are observations by traders of intervention by one of the Group
 of Three central banks: the U.S. Federal Reserve, the German Bundesbank, or the Bank of Japan. The combined series is a
 combination of the three central banks. The columns labeled the "average level" give the average level of the DM/$ and
 yen/$ rates over the sample. "Average level at intervention" reports the average exchange rates at which intervention took
 place. The columns labeled "average level at dollar sales" and "average level at dollar purchases" give the average exchange
 rates at which central banks sold and bought dollars, respectively.
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 Bundesbank, and the Bank of Japan over
 the full period and the three intervention
 periods. Central banks intervened fre-
 quently during the period. For the full sam-
 ple, central-bank intervention by at least
 one of the three central banks, given by the
 "combined" series, occurred 30.4 percent of
 the total days. Notably, central banks inter-
 vened around a much tighter range of the
 exchange rate following the Louvre agree-
 ment than in previous periods. For example,
 from the Plaza to the Tokyo meetings, the
 difference between the average DM/dollar
 rates where the Fed sold and purchased
 dollars was 0.6 DM (2.67-2.17) while the
 same difference following the Louvre Ac-
 cord was 0.06 DM (1.87- 1.81). Overall, the
 joint pattem of intervention and exchange
 rates suggests that greater exchange-rate
 stabilization coincided with more active in-
 tervention.5
 B. Characterizing Occasional
 Intervention Policy
 The evidence in Table 1 and Figure 1
 suggests at least three basic features of
 intervention behavior during the Louvre
 Accord period. First, most interventions
 appear to be directed toward preventing
 exchange-rate movements away from a cen-
 tral level. For example, when the dollar was
 weaker than its targeted level during the
 Louvre Accord, interventions were usually
 dollar purchases, and vice versa.
 Second, a small proportion of interven-
 tion operations were in the opposite direc-
 tion. For the interventions above or below
 the target levels during the Louvre Accord
 period, most but not all of the interventions
 were dollar sales or dollar purchases, re-
 spectively. Thus, when the dollar was weak
 some interventions were dollar sales, and
 vice versa. These interventions may have
 reflected attempts to stabilize fluctuations
 around the exchange rate's current levels.
 Third, although the intervention events may
 be observable by the market, the magni-
 tudes of these interventions are usually not.6
 The first two features of intervention may
 be incorporated into a simple rule. Suppose
 that the authorities wish to target a level of
 the exchange rate, defined as xo, and that
 the fundamentals level determining this rate
 is fo. For the sake of exposition, suppose
 the exchange rate is above the target level
 so that f > fo. Finally, suppose that central
 bankers watch carefully the movements in
 determinants of fundamentals to evaluate
 the effects upon the equilibrium exchange
 rate. Then, the rule may be described as
 follows:
 (3) if f moves away from fo, buy domestic
 currency with probability r, do noth-
 ing with probability 1- u;
 if f moves toward fo, sell domestic
 currency with probability 1d, do noth-
 ing with probability 1-1rd
 where 7u >1 .d* A symmetric argument
 holds for fundamentals below fo.
 This intervention policy clearly incorpo-
 rates the first two empirical features noted
 above: (i) rates are targeted back toward
 their levels with probability rru, and (ii)
 exchange-rate movements toward the target
 level are counteracted with a lower proba-
 bility, 7T '. Below, I will call iru and ird the
 outward and inward intervention probabili-
 ties, respectively.
 The third feature requires making an
 identifying assumption about the unobserv-
 able magnitudes of interventions. Since cen-
 tral bankers are responding to market forces 5The pattern may seem surprising since the inter-
 ventions' effects upon the domestic money supply are
 frequently sterilized by the G-3 central banks and since
 studies such as Lewis (1988) and Kenneth Rogoff (1984)
 indicate that sterilized interventions should have no
 effect. However, evidence in Lewis (1995) suggests that
 the automatic operating procedures by the Federal
 Reserve may induce a lag in the sterilization process.
 See Hali Edison (1993) for a survey of intervention
 studies.
 6Using a continuous stream of Reuters screen data,
 Charles Goodhart and Thomas Hesse (1991) find that
 the intraday volumes of intervention are generally not
 detectable with the exception of the Bank of Japan
 interventions for some episodes.
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 upon the exchange rate, the true interven-
 tion magnitudes should reflect the current
 movement in demand relative to supply for
 foreign exchange. To characterize this inter-
 vention, I will assume that central bankers
 buy or sell sufficient currency to offset the
 incipient movement in the exchange rate.
 To see how this intervention affects the
 fundamentals behavior, consider the stan-
 dard random-walk process in (2) typically
 assumed for fundamentals in the absence
 of intervention. Suppose that the interval
 dt equals 1. Then, defining w(t)-z(t)-
 z(t - 1), the fundamentals process together
 with intervention can be written as
 (4) f (t) - f (t - 1)
 = f(t) - f(t - 1) + a(t)
 = /I + Ouw(t) + a(t)
 where a(t) is - [ ,u + 0 w(t)] when interven-
 tion occurs and 0 otherwise. The magnitude
 of intervention at time t equals a(t), the
 quantity of either domestic currency sales
 (if df is negative) or purchases (if df is
 positive) that offsets the incipient foreign-
 exchange demand. The assumptions in (3)
 and (4) together imply that intervention will
 target the exchange rate around a given
 target level .(since rrd <TU) and that the
 exchange rate will be stabilized around cur-
 rent levels when interventions occur.
 C. Intervention-Distorted Fundamentals
 To compare the intervention model with
 other models in the literature that may ex-
 plain the empirical results found below, the
 model must be developed in continuous
 time. For this purpose, it will be convenient
 to treat the inward and outward probabili-
 ties, Td and iTu, as part of the same contin-
 uous probability function. This probability
 function can be written as iT(f ), where
 (5) O< '(f)<oo forfo<f<f
 -oo<r (f) <0 forf<f<fO
 'Ir(f) < 1 forall fE[f,f
 and where rr is everywhere continuously
 differentiable on f E [ f, f ]. The variables f
 and f are the supports of the distribution
 of fundamentals and can lie anywhere on
 the real line, including ( - oo, oo), when ,u = 0.
 Intervention occurs with probability
 7rr(f(t)). Note that this function has the
 feature that the outward intervention prob-
 ability is greater than the inward interven-
 tion probability since for f > fo, w'(f) > 0,
 and conversely for f < fo. Also, iT is clearly
 minimized at fo. Equation (5) also states
 that the probability of the intervention is
 strictly less than 1.
 The fundamentals process resulting from
 the distortions introduced by intervention
 can be derived using the underlying funda-
 mentals process in the absence of interven-
 tion in (2) together with the probability
 function. Appendix A shows that the contin-
 uous time limit of the fundamentals process
 generated by equations (3), (4), and (5) is a
 diffusion process given by
 (6) df ={[l1-(f)] _-2,T(f))dt
 + Ocrl - ( dz
 where dz is the increment to a Wiener
 process. In Appendix B, I derive the sta-
 tionary limiting distribution of this process.7
 This process has an intuitive interpreta-
 tion. First, the conditional mean is
 (7) E(df) ={4[j-T(f)] -2T(f))dt
 and has two components. The first term
 comes from the effect of the drift term, A,
 in the fundamentals process without inter-
 vention. If intervention occurs, the change
 in fundamentals is zero. Therefore, the con-
 7The Appendix shows that when ,= 0, the as-
 ymptotic distribution of (6) with reflecting barriers
 at (f,f) is as follows: p(f)=A[1- r(f)] where
 A = f/[1 - 1T )] d; is a normalizing constant.
This content downloaded from 130.91.116.186 on Fri, 14 Jul 2017 16:33:33 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 VOL. 85 NO. 4 LEWIS: OCCASIONAL INTERVENTIONS TO TARGET RATES 697
 ditionally expected drift is ,u[1 - i(f)]. The
 second term appears because interventions
 prevent incipient exchange-rate movements
 away from the target level more frequently
 than movements toward the target. Since
 decreases in If - fo I are less likely to prompt
 intervention than increases, this policy in-
 duces mean-reversion in fundamentals given
 by - o'2i'(f ). The gradient fT'(f) drives
 the mean reversion because it is locally the
 difference between the outward and inward
 probabilities of intervention, ffu - fd. The
 other term, 0.2, measures how much vari-
 ability in incipient foreign-exchange de-
 mand is expected to occur within the
 period. Thus, in the absence of drift A,
 intervention policy will tend to keep the
 exchange rate from wandering away from
 the target level.
 The conditional variance of the process in
 (6) is
 (8) E(df2) = 0.2[1- ir(f)J dt.
 Since the probability of stabilizing interven-
 tion increases with deviations from the tar-
 get level, the conditional variance decreases
 with these same deviations. The intuition
 behind the conditional variance is straight-
 forward. In the discrete-time analogue in
 (4), when intervention occurs, the variance
 is zero. Therefore, the variance is the prob-
 ability of no intervention, 1- IT, times the
 variance in the absence of intervention, .2.
 D. Intervention Policy and the
 Equilibrium Exchange Rate
 I can now describe the exchange-rate so-
 lution using the intervention-distorted fun-
 damentals process derived above. The ex-
 change-rate solution can be written as a
 function x = X(f), assumed to be continu-
 ous and twice differentiable. In this case,
 applying Ito's lemma to X(f) using the pro-
 cess of fundamentals in (6) gives
 (9) dx = ({ {1- IT(f)]- U2 r'(f)}X'(f)
 + 2 .2[1 - _T(f )]X"(f )) dt
 + all - IT(f )X'(f ) dz.
 Substituting the expected change in the ex-
 change rate in (9) for E(dx) in (1) gives
 (10) X(f)
 =f + a( 1,[1 - 1t(f cr 2.7T'(f )}X'(f)
 + 2a ru2[1 - T(f)]X"(f).
 Equation (10) is a second-order differen-
 tial equation in X(f ) and therefore is
 unique only up to two boundary conditions.
 These conditions are provided by interven-
 tion policy at the boundaries as exchange
 rates get far away from the target levels.
 For instance, the assumption that the ex-
 change rate is freely floating except for oc-
 casional interventions provides one pair of
 boundary conditions. Alternatively, the pol-
 icy discussion during the Louvre period de-
 scribed by Funabashi (1989) also suggests a
 set of boundary conditions. Specifically, in
 addition to stabilizing rates around the tar-
 get levels, the Louvre Accord stated that
 interventions should keep the exchange
 rates from exceeding 21-5-percent bands
 around these levels. Krugman (1991) points
 out that, if intervention is known to keep
 exchange rates from exceeding a given level,
 then at this point the expected change in
 the exchange rate is zero. This result im-
 plies that a policy of keeping the exchange
 rates within the supports of the distribution
 given by f and f would imply that
 xi(f) = X'() = .
 Alternatively, for a policy of free float ex-
 cept for occasional interventions, the sup-
 ports (f,f) will be infinite. Below, I will
 describe the solution with target bands and
 the effects of these bands becoming arbi-
 trarily large.
 Solving the model in (10) requires specify-
 ing a probability function for intervention.
 For now, I will describe the solution for
 arbitrary probability functions. Given this
 function and two boundary conditions, the
 equation can be solved numerically. In Sec-
 tion II, I will estimate this probability func-
 tion using intervention data.
 The upper panel of Figure 2 describes
 this solution for the case where the bound-
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 Xk (f ) - 2&k - X:f
 aries of f f a
 XIM~~~~~~~~~f
 g ? Xl-rl(f)~~~r(f
 X1(f). This solution corresponds to the in-
 tervention model when target bands are im-
 posed. For illustrative purposes, the proba-
 bility function 7r was assumed to be the
 uniform distribution, and it was defined over
 f2, to make fn symmetric around fo, set
 equal to zero. At the upper boundary,
 traders know intervention will prevent the
 exchange rate from depreciating further.
 Therefore, they bid up the value of domes-
 tic currency relative to foreign currency at
 every lower positive value of fundamentals;
 and vice versa for negative fundamentals.
 This trading behavior comes from the
 knowledge that intervention will prevent the
 exchange rate from exceeding the bands,
 giving the solution in Figure 2 much of its
 nonlinear form. The lower panel of Figure 2
 shows how the exchange-rate behavior de-
 pends upon the probability of no interven-
 tion, 1- fr. The curve labeled 1- nel(f) cor-
 responds to the exchange-rate solution
 X1_(f). This probability function describes a
 natural case in which the points of reflect-
 ing barriers on fundamentals, (f,f), coin-
 cide with the level of fundameiitals where
 the probability of intervention, w-, is arbi-
 trarily close to 1.
 By contrast, the curve labeled 1- T2(f
 depicts a case for which the points of re-
 flecting barriers on fundamentals have in-
 tervention probabilities significantly far from
 1. The exchange-rate solution labeled X2(f)
 in the top half of Figure 2 illustrates the
 resulting exchange-rate solution. Since the
 probability function does not rise as quickly,
 the authorities intervene with less intensity.
 As a result, fundamentals are allowed more
 variation, resulting in a higher discounted
 present value of expected future fundamen-
 tals when f > 0, and a lower present value
 when f < 0. Thus, the exchange-rate bands
 are wider at (x2, x2) than for the case with a
 higher probability of intervention, (xj, .T?).
 As the figure summarizes, for given parame-
 ters a, ,u, and o- from the fundamentals
 process, a range of solutions exist that de-
 pend upon the probability-of-intervention
 function.
 Equation (10) was also solved for increas-
 ingly wider bands of (f, f). As these bands
 get wider, the exchange-rate function be-
 comes highly linear. Whether bands or a
 relatively free float are the appropriate
 boundary conditions is an empirical ques-
 tion that will be investigated below.
 II. Empirical Evidence on Intervention
 Policy and Targeting Rates
 The previous section showed that an in-
 tervention process characteristic of foreign-
 exchange intervention policy by the G-3
 during the late 1980's would distort the be-
 havior of foreign-exchange supply relative
 to demand. It also demonstrated how the
 exchange-rate solution depends directly
 upon the probability of intervention. This
 probability can be estimated empirically.
 Estimating the probability function in
 terms of fundamentals, -T(f), would require
 knowledge of all of the ingredients that
 affect demand and supply of foreign ex-
 change, as well as the function that links
 them together. Since it is well known that
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 this composite fundamental variable is quite
 difficult to measure, I will treat it implicitly
 through the exchange-rate solution. For this
 purpose, recall that the equilibrium ex-
 change rate is given by the monotonically
 increasing function, X(f ). Thus, in equilib-
 rium, any given fundamentals level, f *, im-
 plies a corresponding exchange rate, and
 vice versa so that
 (11) x*=X(f*)= ff*=X-1(x*)
 where X-1(x) is the inverse function of
 X(f). Therefore, the probability of inter-
 vention may be written as an equilibrium
 function of the exchange rate by substitut-
 ing the inverse function in (11) for funda-
 mentals in the probability function:
 (12) ( f*) = 7(X-l(x*))--r*(x*).
 Using the exchange-rate levels where inter-
 vention occurred, the probability function
 can be estimated empirically without speci-
 fying the fundamentals variables.8 The fol-
 lowing subsection provides empirical esti-
 mates of the intervention probability as a
 function of the exchange rate.
 A. Estimating the Intervention Probability
 as a Function of the Exchange Rate
 I consider three possible events, defined
 as I, which may occur on any given day, t:
 I, = 0 for "no intervention," I, = 1 for "in-
 tervention to weaken the dollar" (dollar
 sales), and I, = - 1 for "intervention to sup-
 port the dollar" (dollar purchases). Sum-
 mary results concerning these series during
 the period 1985-1987 are provided
 in Table 1.
 To match these observations with the
 model above, a form for the intervention
 probability must be specified. This interven-
 tion probability appears to be better charac-
 terized empirically in units of the level of
 the exchange rate, st exp(xt), rather than
 the logarithm of the exchange rate, x,. As in
 equation (12), this probability can be re-
 lated back to fundamentals:
 (12') 7(f*)= 7T(X-l(ln(s*))) 7T'(s*).
 Since ln(s,) is a monotonic function, esti-
 mates of rs(s,) can be easily mapped into
 7 *(x,), a procedure I follow throughout the
 analysis below.
 The multinomial logistic distribution over
 the three possible intervention events pro-
 vides a relatively good fit of the intervention
 data. This probability distribution is given
 by
 (13a) ln{Pr(It = - 1)/Pr(It = 1))
 = Co + CiSt-i
 (13b) ln{Pr(It = O)/Pr(It = 1))
 = go + g1st-1
 where co, c1, go, and g1 are parameters to
 be estimated.9 The probabilities are based
 upon the lagged exchange rate in order to
 minimize potential endogeneity problems.
 Note that these equations are intended to
 provide estimates for the model above and
 should not be viewed as reaction functions.
 Clearly, additional variables could affect the
 likelihood of intervention, but these vari-
 ables should also be present in the exchange
 rate through the equilibrium relationship in
 (11).
 The parameters in the probability func-
 tion (13) can be used to determine whether
 the probability of intervention is increasing
 with deviations from a target level, as im-
 plied by the intervention model. In (13a), a
 fall in the price of dollars should increase
 the probability of interventions to buy dol-
 lars relative to the probability of interven-
 81 will also empirically examine the exchange-rate
 solution allowing for different assumptions about fun-
 damentals.
 9For details on the multinomial logistic model, see
 G. S. Maddala (1983).
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 TABLE 2-PROBABILITY OF INTERVENTION ESTIMATES FOR THE LOUVRE PERIOD
 (Pr(I=-1) (Pr(t =0)
 ' Pr(It = 1) J l Pr(I, = 1) +
 A. DM/Dollar:
 Pr(It =-1) Pr(I = 0)
 Percentage Mean Target Mean Target Estimated
 Central bank c0 c1 go g1 predicted DM1.82/$ DM1.82/$ DM1.82/$ DM1.82/$ target
 Federal 156* -84* 127* -67* 85.8 0.12 0.12 0.87 0.87 1.85
 Reserve (40) (21) (34) (18)
 Bundesbank 144* - 79* 79* -41* 85.2 0.02 0.02 0.97 0.97 1.82
 (33) (18) (24) (13)
 Bank of Japana - - 51* -29* 77.5 0.14 0.14 0.86 0.86 -
 (15) (8)
 Combined 125* - 68* 77* - 40* 68.0 0.05 0.05 0.94 0.94 1.83
 (27) (15) (22) (12)
 B. Yen/Dollar: Pr(It =-1) Pr(It =0)
 Percentage Mean Target Mean Target Estimated
 Central bank c0 cl go g1 predicted Y146.0/$ Y149.8/$ Y146.0/$ Y149.8/$ target
 Federal 66.7* -0.45 * 55.1* -0.35* 87.6 0.05 0.03 0.94 0.91 147.0
 Reserve (22.8) (0.15) (20.6) (0.14)
 Bundesbank 58.5* -0.40 * 23.0t -0.14t 85.2 0.07 0.03 0.86 0.86 147.0
 (17.4) (0.12) (12.3) (0.08)
 Bank of Japana - - 26.8 * -0.19 * 79.3 0.28 0.16 0.72 0.84 -
 (7.6) (0.05)
 Combined 51.1* - 0.34 * 26.3 * - 0.16 * 69.2 0.17 0.09 0.78 0.83 150.4
 (13.2) (0.09) (11.5) (0.08)
 Notes: Each equation was estimated by multinomial logit with 169 observations for the period February 22, 1987, to
 October 18, 1987. The columns headed by coefficients report the estimates, with the standard errors in parentheses. The
 column labeled "percentage predicted" reports the goodness-of-fit test described in Maddala (1983) and is the percentage
 of observations correctly predicted by the model. The "Pr(It = -1)" and "Pr(It = 0)" columns give the estimated probabili -
 ties of interventions of dollar purchases and no intervention, respectively, at given exchange rates. These exchange rates are
 either the means over the period (under "mean") or the official target levels (under "target"). (The target level for Japan is
 the midpoint between the initial and rebased targets. ) These probabilities are calculated by substituting the exchange-rate
 levels into the multinomial logit equations at the top of the table. The final column, "estimated target," gives the estimate
 of the exchange rate at which the intervention probability is minimized: s = [ln(gl /c1 - gl)- col/cl.
 aReported estimates do not include I = 1 since there were no dollar sales. Equations were: ln(Pr(It = 0)/Pr(It= -1))=
 go + gst- 1*
 tStatistically significant at the 10-percent marginal significance level.
 *Statistically significant at the 5-percent marginal significance level.
 tions to sell dollars. Therefore, the model
 predicts that cl < 0. In (13b), a fall in the
 price of dollars should reduce the probabil-
 ity of interventions to sell dollars relative to
 no intervention, implying g, <0. Finally,
 subtracting (13b) from (13a) gives the prob-
 ability of buying dollars relative to no inter-
 vention. A fall in the price of dollars should
 increase the probability of buying dollars
 relative to no intervention, implying that
 1c11>1gl.
 The minimum of this probability function
 can also be used to determine an implied
 target level: s0 = exp(x.). Minimizing the
 probability of intervention from equations
 (13) gives the exchange-rate level:
 ln(g /(c1 - g1))- Co
 (14) so =
 Cl
 Table 2 reports the parameter estimates
 of the probability function for the yen/dol-
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 lar rate and for the DM/dollar rate, during
 the Louvre period.'0 As the results show, the
 model provides a fairly good fit. The coeffi-
 cients for all of the central banks and the
 combined intervention equations are signifi-
 cantly different than zero and have the an-
 ticipated signs and magnitudes. The table
 also reports the estimates of the interven-
 tion probabilities implied by substituting the
 mean exchange-rate levels and the official
 target levels, respectively, into equation (13).
 Finally, the last column shows the target
 levels implied by substituting the estimated
 parameters into equation (14). For the
 deutsche mark, the combined minimum in-
 tervention probability levels are near the
 official target of 1.825 DM/dollar and the
 yen estimate lies near Y149.8/dollar,
 the midpoint between the original and the
 later rebased targets.
 In sum, these results corroborate the view
 that the probability of intervention was an
 increasing function of the deviation be-
 tween exchange rates and their target levels
 following the Louvre Accord. Below, I will
 use these estimates to examine the relation-
 ship between the exchange rate and its im-
 plicit fundamentals.
 B. Were There Credible Target Bands?
 Evidence Based Upon Nonlinearity Tests
 When target bands are credibly enforced
 by intervention, the exchange rate will re-
 spond less than proportionally to move-
 ments in fundamental variables, as illus-
 trated in Figure 2. This basic relationship is
 consistent with all models that assume
 known target bands. Without credible bands,
 however, the exchange rate depends only
 upon the daily movements of fundamentals
 including occasional interventions.
 In this subsection, I will test for nonlin-
 earities in the exchange-rate function that
 arise from target bands. The presence of
 the intervention probability function itself
 im-plies nonlinearities, even in the absence
 of bands. Therefore, I will also consider
 whether the exchange-rate model in the ab-
 sence of bands can provide sufficiently
 strong nonlinearities to be detected by these
 tests.
 Testing for Nonlinearities.-William Cleve-
 land and Susan Devlin (1988) propose a test
 of nonlinearities based upon "locally
 weighted regression"(LWR) against the null
 hypothesis of a linear regression."1 The test
 is a modified F test of two alternative mod-
 els. The linear model is a simple linear
 regression over all sample points and com-
 prises the null hypothesis. The alternative
 nonlinear LWR model estimates a linear
 relationship for each data point weighted by
 a window of its nearest observations as
 measured by the units of the variables. In
 this way, the LWR traces out general non-
 linear relationships. If the nonlinear rela-
 tionship provides a better fit than does the
 linear one, then the sum of squared errors
 will be lower for this model, and the F test
 will reject the hypothesis that the models
 are the same. Below, I call this F test the
 C-D (Cleveland-Devlin) test.
 This methodology can be used to examine
 the importance of targeted bands in the
 intervention model. To see how, note first
 that the exchange-rate process evolves ac-
 cording to the general form: dx = mX dt +
 ox dz, where mx is the conditional mean
 and ax is the conditional standard devia-
 tion, and where, from (9), assuming , = 0,12
 (15a) mx= - a2'(f)X'(f)
 + 4U2[1_- r(f)]X"(f)
 '0Lewis (1990) shows that this specification fits the
 other periods in Table 1 as well.
 IlRichard Meese and Andrew Rose (1990, 1991)
 and Frank Diebold and James Nason (1990) use this
 test to examine nonlinearities in the level of the ex-
 change rate over different time periods, finding results
 consistent with this paper.
 2 When ,u was allowed to differ from zero in the
 tests, the estimates were very poorly behaved, appar-
 ently due to multicollinearity. However, the empirical
 analysis will allow for the potential presence of a
 constant drift term.
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 To construct tests for nonlinearities due
 to target bands in the conditional mean, it is
 important to examine the sources of nonlin-
 earities. The mean in (15a) is nonlinear in
 fundamentals both because the probability
 ir(f) is a nonlinear function and because
 X(f) is nonlinear. As described above, much
 of the nonlinearity in X(f ) derives from the
 potential effects of target bands. As the
 bands become arbitrarily large, X(f) be-
 comes relatively linear. However, some lin-
 earity remains even in the absence of target
 bands because of the form of the interven-
 tion probability.
 To examine whether nonlinearities aris-
 ing primarily from bands are important while
 also allowing for nonlinearities due to the
 intervention probability, I constructed a
 pseudo-linear null hypothesis. Specifically,
 note that as X(f) becomes close to linear,
 X'(f) becomes relatively constant and
 X"(f) approaches 0. Retaining nonlinearity
 in the absence of target bands due to the
 derivative of the intervention probability,
 this null hypothesis can be written as
 (16) (xt-xt,-)=ao+ai1r*(xt-_)+ut
 where ao = 0 and a1 = - a2[X'(f)]2.
 Under the null hypothesis that X'(f) is
 constant, equation (16) represents a linear
 regression since the derivative of the proba-
 bility is treated as data. Equation (16)
 rewrites the probability process as a func-
 tion of the exchange rate and uses the fact
 that in equilibrium 7r'(f) = 7r*'(x)X'(f).
 Since the derivative of the probability is a
 nonlinear function, X'(f ) obviously cannot
 be literally constant even in the absence of
 hard target bands. However, I will show
 below that the degree of nonlinearities in-
 duced by the probability function would not
 be sufficient to reject linearity even though
 the nonlinearity implied by target bands
 would be. Therefore, this test should be
 viewed as a test for the presence of hard
 bands around the target level, not as a gen-
 eral test of nonlinearities. As the alternative
 hypothesis, if target bands induce nonlinear-
 ities in the exchange-rate process, then
 X'(f) will not be a constant and X"(f) # 0,
 so that the exchange rate will be a nonlinear
 function of v*' in (16).
 Implementing the nonlinearity test re-
 quires a measure for fundamentals. Since
 these variables are unobservable, I use three
 different measures and check the robust-
 ness of the results. The first measure is
 based upon the monetary model which
 maintains that exchange rates are deter-
 mined by relative monetary policies across
 countries. As daily data on money supplies
 are not available, I use interest rates that
 central banks monitor for monetary policy.
 The rates are the federal funds rate for the
 United States, the Lombard rate for Ger-
 many, and the call money rate for Japan.13
 The second measure is motivated by
 Robert Flood and Rose (1993) who identify
 "virtual fundamentals" as the fundamentals
 level implied by the discrete-time form of
 equation (1): ft = x, - aE,Ax,. To obtain a
 measure of E,Axx, I regressed Ax on the
 difference between Eurocurrency interest
 rates for the dollar, deutsche mark, and yen
 from the London Financial Times and used
 the fitted values. For a, I considered a
 range from 0 to 3.
 Panel A of Table 3, reports marginal sig-
 nificance levels of the null hypothesis that
 the conditional mean of the exchange rate is
 linear in the derivative of the probability of
 intervention. To calculate the probability of
 intervention series, I use the form of the
 probability function defined in equation (13)
 and impose the estimates of the parameters
 obtained in Table 2 from the combined
 intervention. Appendix C explains in detail
 how the probabilities and their derivatives
 are constructed from the parameter esti-
 mates.
 The columns in Table 3A specify the fun-
 damental variable used. The Cleveland-
 13These data are from the Bank of International
 Settlements. The tests, as well as parametric estimates
 discussed in the Appendix, were also conducted using
 the call money rate in Germany without affecting the
 main conclusions.
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 TABLE 3-TEsTs FOR NONLINEARITIES FROM INTERVENTION MODEL
 A. Cleveland-Devlin Tests for Null Hypothesis of "Linear"Conditional Mean
 DM/$ fundamentals Yen/$ fundamentals
 Virtual Virtual
 Monetary a =0 a=3 Monetary a =0 a =3
 Marginal significance level: 0.601 0.329 0.602 0.225 0.216 0.383
 Number of observations: (104) (138) (61) (75) (77) (61)
 B. Probability of Insignificant Cleveland-Devlin Tests
 DM/$ Yen/$
 Bands Present
 Proportion of times marginal significance level greater than 5 percent: 0.000 0.000
 Proportion of times marginal significance level greater than estimate: 0.000 0.000
 Bands Not Present
 Proportion of times marginal significance level greater than 5 percent: 0.862 0.954
 Proportion of times marginal significance level greater than 10 percent: 0.775 0.911
 Proportion of times marginal=significance level greater than estimate: 0.243 0.781
 Notes: For panel A, the entries are the marginal significance levels of the hypothesis that Axt = ao + al1r,*' + u, is
 linear given the fundamentals in the column. These levels are the minimums over a grid search of neighborhood
 windows ranging from 0.4 to 0.9 times the sample size, as described in Cleveland and Devlin (1988). The numbers of
 parentheses are the numbers of observations in the window of the minimum marginal significance level.
 Panel B reports the results of Monte Carlo experiments on monetary fundamentals. The intervention model is
 estimated parametrically as described in the Appendix. Using these estimates and imposing the assumption of
 bands at the maximum exchange-rate levels over the sample, exchange rates and fundamentals were drawn for the
 length of the sample and Cleveland-Devlin statistics (C-D) were calculated. The rows of the table report the
 proportion of times out of 1,000 replications that the C-D F statistic from the generated model had a marginal
 significance level greater than 5 percent, greater than 10 percent, and greater than the estimates in panel A for
 "monetary."
 Devlin test requires specifying a proportion
 q of the sample size as the local window
 around each observation for estimating the
 LWR. Following Meese and Rose (1991), I
 conducted each test repeatedly over a grid
 search from q = 0.4 to q = 1 in increments
 of 0.1. The entries in the table report the
 minimum marginal significance level for the
 F tests found over this grid search. As such,
 they provide the strongest evidence possible
 against linearity. The numbers in parenthe-
 ses are the numbers of observations in the
 windows.
 As the entries show, there is no evidence
 against linearity for either currency or for
 any of the extreme measures of fundamen-
 tals. This evidence suggests that the ex-
 change rate is close to a linear function in
 fundamentals. Apparently, the market did
 not believe that central bankers would in-
 tervene with certainty at the target bands
 suggested by the Louvre Accord.'
 There are two potential problems with
 this evidence, however. First, the test may
 have poor power for detecting nonlineari-
 ties arising from the target bands. Second,
 the derivative of the probability is clearly a
 nonlinear function of fundamentals, raising
 the question of why this source of nonlin-
 earity is not detected by the test. I will
 describe Monte Carlo evidence on these
 two questions next.
 14With different methodology, Michael Klein and
 Lewis (1993) similarly find that the intervention policy
 of the G-3 central banks following the Louvre Accord
 was inconsistent with given target bands.
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 Can the Test Detect the Nonlinearities Im-
 plied by Target Bands?-To ask whether the
 lack of evidence against linearity in panel A
 of Table 3 was due to a lack of power, I first
 estimated parametrically the conditional
 mean in equation (15). The Appendix pro-
 vides details about this estimation. I then
 imposed reflecting barriers on the exchange
 rate at the maximum levels of exchange
 rates observed over the period. Using this
 model as the data-generating process, I re-
 peatedly drew observations for sample sizes
 corresponding to the data set and calcu-
 lated the C-D statistic 1,000 times.
 The first part of panel B of Table 3
 (under "bands present') reports the propor-
 tion of times that the statistic exceeded the
 5-percent marginal significance level using
 monetary fundamentals.'5 Panel B also re-
 ports the proportion of times in the Monte
 Carlo experiments that the statistic ex-
 ceeded the marginal significance level re-
 ported in panel A. As the evidence shows,
 the marginal significance levels of the test
 for nonlinearities arising from target bands
 were always less than 5 percent and there-
 fore clearly less than either 10 percent or
 the estimates in panel B. This evidence in-
 dicates that nonlinearities arising from tar-
 get bands implied by the Louvre Accord
 should have been easily detected by the
 C-D test. For this reason, the evidence in
 panel B suggests that nonlinearities arising
 from these bands are very unlikely to be
 present.
 Can the Test Detect the Nonlinearities Im-
 plied by the Intervention Policy?-The re-
 maining problem with the nonlinearity tests
 comes from the probability of intervention.
 The evidence in Table 3A indicates that the
 exchange-rate function is relatively linear in
 fundamentals. Yet at the same time the
 exchange rate is a linear function of the
 derivative of the intervention probability,
 itself a nonlinear function of fundamentals.
 These two results are not inconsistent,
 however, if the degree of nonlinearity im-
 plied by the probability of intervention with-
 out target bands is sufficiently weak that it
 cannot be detected by the C-D tests. To
 consider this possibility, I conducted an-
 other set of Monte Carlo experiments. I
 used the same estimated model as above
 but did not impose the target-zone barriers.
 I then generated data from this model for
 the length of the data sample and calcu-
 lated the C-D statistic 1,000 times.
 The second part of Table 3B reports the
 proportion of times that the marginal signif-
 icance level exceeded the 5-percent and 10-
 percent levels and the proportion of times it
 exceeded the estimate reported in panel A.
 Interestingly, the marginal significance level
 exceeded 10 percent at least 77 percent of
 the time. Thus, even though nonlinearties
 were present from the probability function,
 the C-D statistic would not provide rejec-
 tions at least 77 percent of the time.
 Even in the case of the DM/$ rate for
 which the marginal significance level was
 0.601 in panel A, panel B says that ex-
 change rates with nonlinearities arising
 solely from the intervention probability
 would have marginal significance levels ex-
 ceeding this level 24 percent of the time.
 This evidence therefore reconciles the ap-
 parent inconsistency posed above. The C-D
 statistic is sufficiently powerful to detect
 nonlinearities in the exchange rate arising
 from target bands, but not to detect those
 arising from the probability of intervention
 alone. Estimates of this relationship below
 will verify that the exchange rate is a rela-
 tively linear function of fundamentals when
 the potential nonlinearities arise from the
 probability of intervention.
 C. The Intervention Model Without
 Credible Target Bands
 Strictly speaking, the intervention model
 implies that X'(f ) is nonlinear; but the
 simulations reported in Table 3 indicate that
 such nonlinearity is very difficult to detect. I
 therefore estimate the model assuming that
 X'(f) is constant. This approach has the
 advantage that the conditional mean and
 15Virtual fundamentals are measured as an identity
 in terms of the exchange rate, so parametric estimation
 of the exchange rate against this measure is not possi-
 ble.
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 TABLE 4-JOINT ESTIMATION OF THE EXCHANGE RATE AND INTERVENTION
 DM/$ Yen/$
 p value p value
 Parameters Individual Joint (Ho: 8 = 1) Individual Joint (Ho: 8 = 1)
 ao -0.018 -0.227 - 0.134t -0.446
 (0.041) (0.249) (0.075) (0.566)
 (O,Xt)2 0.021* 0.003* 0.034t 0.003b
 (0.011) (< 0.001) (0.019) (0.001)
 ln( oX')2 -1.136 - 1.179* - 1.498* - 1.140*
 (0.855) (0.026) (0.460) (0.251)
 f3 0.480t 1.595* 0.262 0.360 0.924 0.910
 (0.262) (0.529) (0.240) (0.675)
 CO 125.700* 128.460* 51.140* 49.230*
 (26.690) (3.250) (13.190) (6.060)
 cl - 67.970* - 69.600* - 0.341* - 0.327*
 (14.510) (1.740) (0.090) (0.042)
 go 76.230* 75.210* 26.100* 24.650*
 (22.490) (1.150) (11.560) (3.510)
 91 - 40.210* - 39.610* - 0.161* -0.151*
 (12.160) (0.620) (0.080) (0.025)
 Notes: The table reports the estimates of the parameters given on the left-hand side
 using one-step maximum likelihood for the system of equations given by (13), (16), and
 (17). The standard errors are in parentheses. The entries under "individual" give the
 results based upon estimating the conditional mean (16), variance (17), and probability
 equations (13) separately. Those under "joint" are based on estimating them jointly.
 Estimates in the conditional-mean equation are multiplied by 100 to convert them into
 percentage change. The columns labeled "p value (Ho: , = 1)" give the marginal
 significance levels for the hypothesis that 13 = 1 in the joint equation. All equations
 are estimated with the combined intervention series from February 22, 1987, to
 October 18, 1987.
 tStatistically significant at the 10-percent marginal significance level.
 * Statistically significant at the 5-percent marginal significance level.
 variance of the exchange rate can be esti-
 mated without requiring that fundamentals
 be specified.
 When X(f) is linear, the conditional mo-
 ments in (15) reduce to (16) for the mean
 and
 (17) u2 = exp(bo) [1-,T*(xt-1)] et
 for the variance, where bo = log[ c- 2X'(f )2
 and ,3 = 1 and where et is assumed to be
 lognormally distributed with a mean of unity.
 The form of the probability function was
 given in equations (13). The derivation of
 7T*(x) from the parameters of the logistic
 function are detailed in Appendix C.
 Table 4 reports the estimates of the inter-
 vention model in (13) together with the con-
 ditional mean in (16) and variance in (17).
 The "individual" column entries report the
 results based upon estimating each equation
 individually, while the "joint" column en-
 tries are the results of estimating the inter-
 vention, mean, and variance equations
 jointly by maximum likelihood.16 The joint
 estimation uses the relationship across
 equations (16) and (17) that exp(bo) = a1.
 The numbers in parentheses are the stan-
 dard errors.
 The results point to several interesting
 features. First, the constant ao is not signifi-
 cantly different from zero at the 5-percent
 level and is significant at the 10-percent
 level only for the individual yen/$ equation.
 All of the other parameters are significantly
 different from zero at the 5-percent level
 16The equations were estimated jointly by one-step
 maximum likelihood, beginning with the initial consis-
 tent estimates from the individual equation estimates
 in Table 3.
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 FIGURE 3. CONDITIONAL MEANS AND VARIANCES OF ExCHANGE RATEs BASED ON INTERVENTION POLICY
 Note: The graphs are constructed from the estimates in Table 4.
 with the exception of / for the yen/$ ex-
 change rate. Furthermore, ,3 is insignifi-
 cantly different from 1.
 Figure 3 illustrates the implications of
 these estimates for the exchange-rate be-
 havior. The top panels depict the expected
 change in the exchange rate as a function of
 the fundamentals level corresponding to dif-
 ferent exchange-rate levels. When the
 DM/$ rate was 1.77 so that the dollar was
 weak, the intervention policy meant that the
 dollar rate was expected to appreciate by
 0.024 percent per day. Similarly, when the
 dollar was at its maximum over the period,
 intervention induced an expected 0.028-per-
 cent depreciation over the next day. To put
 these estimates into perspective over this
 period, these changes represented 5 percent
 and 6.3 percent of the average appreciation
 and depreciation, respectively, or 52 times
 and 7 times the average exchange-rate
 change. The effects of the intervention on
 the yen are smaller. The expected apprecia-
 tion of the dollar at its low end is only 0.3
 percent of the average change, while that of
 the expected depreciation at the high end is
 0.1 percent. These estimates match the de-
 scription in Yoichi Funabashi (1989) which
 suggests that interventions against the yen
 were largely to keep the dollar from falling
 further.
 To give some sense of the relative preci-
 sion of the estimates, the top panel also
 plots 2-standard-error bands based upon the
 conditional-mean equation alone using the
 joint-equation estimates.'7 These bands sug-
 gest that the conditional-mean estimates are
 more precisely estimated for the deutsche
 mark.
 17These standard errors were based upon the first
 equation alone and were calculated as SD(a1) (X'X)
 where SD(a1) is the standard deviation of a1 and X is
 the matrix of iT' observations. The true standard errors
 are functions of all the equations in the system and
 may be larger.
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 The lower panels depict the estimates of
 the conditional variances. Recall, however,
 that the yen/$ estimates are insignificantly
 different from zero in Table 4. Interestingly,
 the DM/$ estimates show the pattern im-
 plied by the model. The variance is mini-
 mized at the upper and lower levels of the
 exchange-rate range. To put these estimates
 into perspective, the conditional standard
 deviations of the DM/$ rate at its lower
 and upper range, as percentages of the
 overall standard deviation are 56 percent
 and 59 percent, respectively. The yen/$
 standard deviation is minimized at the lower
 range of the exchange rate at 0.39, repre-
 senting 33 percent of the standard devia-
 tion.
 III. Relationship Between
 the Occasional-Intervention Model
 and Standard Models
 I showed above how the exchange rate
 would be affected by an intervention policy
 characteristic of the behavior of the G-3
 central banks during the late 1980's. The
 Louvre Accord was followed by a period in
 which these central bankers were perceived
 as targeting rates and potentially keeping
 these rates within bands.
 The band behavior is a feature central to
 all "target-zone" models, first described by
 Paul Krugman (1991). Furthermore, some
 of the empirical results found above may
 seem consistent with these models as well.18
 It is therefore useful to contrast the occa-
 sional-intervention model and this popular
 model.
 A. Theoretical Comparison
 The Krugman model assumes that funda-
 mentals evolve according to equation (2) but
 have reflecting barriers at upper and lower
 levels of fundamentals. Defining XK =
 XK(f) as the solution to equation (1), using
 equation (2) as the fundamentals process,
 and applying Ito's lemma to XK yields:
 (18) dxK = [ Xk((f) + 1r2Xji(f)] dt
 + rXk(f ) dz.
 Substituting the expected exchange-rate
 change from (18) into (1) gives the Krugman
 solution.
 Figure 2 demonstrates how the interven-
 tion model differs from the Krugman model
 when both models incorporate the same
 target bands as boundary conditions. First,
 for identical fundamentals boundaries (f, f),
 the implied bands of the exchange rates
 with intervention probabilities wl or lr2 are
 (xl, x1) or (x2, x2), respectively. These bands
 are obviously tighter than the corresponding
 Krugman bands (XK, XK). The intuition for
 this result is clear. With the occasional in-
 tervention policy, the market believes that
 central bankers will intervene to attenuate
 movements away from the target level.
 Therefore, when the exchange rate is above
 xo, the present value of the expected future
 path of excess money supply will be smaller
 with occasional intervention than without it;
 and vice versa when the exchange rate is
 below xo. Hence, the bands are tighter.
 Some of the features of exchange-rate
 behavior when the fundamentals process is
 distorted- by the occasional intervention re-
 semble those when fundamentals follow
 a different mean-reverting process, the
 Ornstein-Uhlenbeck (O-U) process:
 (19) df =-p(f-fo)dt + o-dz.
 Defining xou = Xou(f) as the solution
 generated by (19), Ito's lemma gives the
 evolution of the exchange rate as
 (20) dxou ={-P(f-fo)Xou(f)
 + 2o 2XJT(f)}dt
 + OrXou(f) dz.
 Delgado and Dumas (1992) solve this prob-
 lem in detail.
 18Svensson (1992) provides a critical survey of the
 literature.
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 A comparison of the O-U process in (19)
 with the intervention-distorted fundamen-
 tals process in (6) shows their similarities
 and differences. The size of the expected
 change in the exchange rate is minimized at
 fo for both cases. On the other hand, the
 two processes differ in the effect of inter-
 vention upon the variance in the absence of
 target bands. While the variance of the O-U
 process is unaffected by intervention, target-
 ing interventions locally to stabilize ex-
 change rates tends to reduce the variance of
 exchange rates as they move away from
 fundamentals, as described in (6).
 B. Do the Standard Target-Zone Models
 Generate Nonlinearnties Empirically?
 In Tables 3 and 4, I showed that the
 behavior of exchange rates was consistent
 with an intervention model without target
 bands. However, these estimates may be
 picking up relationships captured by one of
 the two alternative processes above. There-
 fore, I also tested the null hypothesis of
 linearities in conditional means based upon
 these models.
 From the Krugman exchange-rate process
 in (18), the analogue to the intervention-
 model conditional mean and variance in
 (15) is
 (21a) mX, K = ,UXK(f) +o2XK(f)
 (21b) ax K =. ?2XK(f)2.
 If bands are not present, then Xk(f) = 1,
 XW(f) 0, and the conditional mean re-
 duces to
 (22) (Xt-xt_l)ao+ut
 where ao = ,u. Similarly, for the O-U pro-
 cess in (20), the moments are:
 (23a) mxou = - p(f-fO)XoU(f)
 + 14c 2X;U (f)
 (23b) 0t2oU = 2Xou(f)2.
 If Xou(f) is relatively linear as when bands
 are not present, the conditional mean can
 be written as
 (24) (x,-x_1) =aO+a1ft_1 +ut
 where aO = pfo and a1 = - pX'(f ). If not,
 the linearity of equation (24) will be re-
 jected.
 Panel A of Table 5 reports the results of
 C-D tests for nonlinearities arising from
 these models against the null hypothesis of
 (22) for the Krugman model and (24) for the
 O-U model. As with the intervention model,
 there is no evidence of nonlinearities arising
 from a target band. All of the marginal
 significance levels are greater than 10 per-
 cent.
 To check for the power of the test statis-
 tic when bands are present in these models,
 I conducted similar Monte Carlo experi-
 ments as in Table 3. I estimated a para-
 metric version of the models using the
 monetary fundamentals, as described in Ap-
 pendix D. The nonlinearity parameters in
 these estimates are all insignificantly differ-
 ent from zero, corroborating the evidence in
 panel A of Table 5. I then used these esti-
 mates together with the restriction of re-
 flecting barriers on the exchange rate to
 provide data-generating processes for Monte
 Carlo experiments on the C-D test statistic.
 The parametric O-U model for the Japanese
 yen did not converge, so that these Monte
 Carlo experiments were not performed.
 Panel B of Table 5 reports the results of
 these experiments. For the available results,
 the C-D test statistics were never greater
 than 5 percent, as for the occasional-
 intervention model. These results indicate
 that the C-D tests are quite powerful.
 Therefore, standard target-zone models do
 not appear to help explain the exchange-rate
 behavior over the period.
 IV. Concluding Remarks and Directions
 for Future Research
 This paper has shown how an interven-
 tion policy characteristic of G-3 central
 banks during the late 1980's would have
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 TABLE 5-TESTS FOR NONLINEARITIES FROM STANDARD MODELS
 A. Cleveland-Devlin Tests for Null Hypothesis of "Linear"Conditional Mean
 DM/$ fundamentals Yen/$ fundamentals
 Virtual Virtual
 Model Monetary a =0 a =3 Monetary a =0 a =3
 Krugman 0.608 0.118 0.123 0.279 0.640 0.140
 (60) (134) (138) (75) (134) (61)
 Ornstein-Uhlenbeck 0.520 0.616 0.398 0.193 0.583 0.248
 (60) (134) (61) (82) (134) (61)
 B. Probability of Insignificant Cleveland-Devlin Tests When BandsAre Present
 DM/$ Yen/$
 Krugman model
 Proportion of times marginal significance level greater than 5 percent: 0.000 0.000
 Proportion of times marginal significance level greater than estimate: 0.000 0.000
 Omstein-Uhlenbeck model
 Proportion of times marginal significance level greater than 5 percent: 0.000 N.A.
 Proportion of times marginal significance level greater than estimate: 0.000 N.A.
 Notes: For panel A, the entries are the marginal significance levels of the hypothesis that Axt = ao + ut for the
 Krugman model and Axt = a0 + a,ft-1 + ut for the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck model are linear given the fundamentals
 in the column. These levels are the minimum levels over a grid search of neighborhood windows ranging from 0.4 to
 0.9 of the sample size, as described in Cleveland and Devlin (1988). The numbers in parentheses are the numbers of
 observations in the window of the minimum marginal significance level.
 Panel B reports the results of Monte Carlo experiments on monetary fundamentals. The models are estimated
 parametrically as described in Appendix D. Using these estimates and imposing the assumption of bands at the
 maximum exchange-rate levels over the sample, exchange rates and fundamentals were drawn for the length of the
 sample, and C-D statistics were calculated. The table reports the proportion of times out of 1,000 replications that
 the C-D F statistic from the generated model had a marginal significance level greater than 5 percent and greater
 than the estimates in panel A for "monetary."
 altered the behavior of foreign-exchange
 demand relative to supply and, therefore,
 exchange-rate behavior. The exchange-rate
 solution in terms of its intervention-altered
 fundamental determinants depends directly
 upon the probability of intervention, which
 can be estimated from observed interven-
 tion behavior. In the paper, this probability
 was estimated jointly with the exchange-rate
 behavior.
 Interestingly, the evidence finds that in-
 tervention policy had a significant effect
 upon the exchange rate during the Louvre
 Accord period. On the other hand, the mag-
 nitudes of the intervention effects upon the
 expected change in the exchange rate were
 relatively small, particularly for the yen/$
 exchange rate. The strongest effect of inter-
 vention policy was to reduce the variability
 of the DM/$ exchange rate as it deviated
 from the target level. Since the Louvre Ac-
 cord was a period of active intervention
 policy, these findings suggest that the ef-
 fects of intervention, even if significant, are
 likely to be even smaller in other episodes.
 APPENDIX A: DERIVATION OF THE
 INTERVENTION-DISTORTED PROCESS
 IN EQUATION (6)
 Equation (6) in the text provides a contin-
 uous-time approximation to the discrete-
 time process for fundamentals in equation
 (4) based upon the probability function in
 equations (3) and (5). To see why, first
 discretize the state-space of fundamentals
 and redefine the fundamentals process in
 (2) as k (= f) and write it as a binomial
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 process. Thus, let k range over values such
 that
 (Al) kj- -ki = Vi
 where starting at ki, a small period of time
 r later one would have:
 ki1 with probability p
 kj 1 with probability q
 where p = (1/2)[1 -( (cr/l)] and q =
 (l1/2)[l +( ,r/f)]. Define the fundamen-
 tals process distorted by fundamentals to be
 f(t). Then, if at time t, ki = fi, r periods
 later one would have
 (A2) fi-I with probability p[l- W(kj_j)]
 fi + 1 with probability q [ l - w ( ki + 1
 fi with probability pTr(ki-1)
 + qv(ki+ ).
 Thus, the probability of intervention in the
 case of movements away from the band is
 ITu = w1(ki+1), while the probability of inter-
 vention in case of movements toward the
 band is ird = ir(ki-1). Clearly, then iTd < TU
 as specified in equation (3).
 Next, this discrete-time process may be
 approximated as a continuous process by
 taking the limit as the interval of time, r,
 becomes small following the steps in Daniel
 Nelson (1990). For this purpose, consider
 now the changes in the original fundamen-
 tals and the intervention-distorted funda-
 mentals over the interval of time r, and
 index these processes according to the time
 indexes Jff0 Tf9 Tf2Tr 9 rTnT and Tko, T7kT
 Tk2T, ... , Tknrl. Define the family of sigma
 algebras generated by the TfnT sequence as
 rQnTr Finally, create the continuous-time
 process as: Tft = TfnT. If it exists, the limit
 diffusion has the following form:
 (A3) df = a(f) dt + b( f )'12dz
 where
 a(f) = lim T'E{(Tf(nl+l)-Tfnx )I|Tnn}
 b(f)= lim T-nlE(( TfflT)I flT}
 (see e.g., S. Karlin and H. M. Taylor, 1981).
 Defining the standard Weiner process ob-
 served over these intervals as TZ(n-l)T
 TZnT ... the process using equation (4) can
 be written as follows:
 (A4) (rTnT + TZ(n+l)T + 1st
 Tf(n+l)T= when no intervention
 Tfn when intervention.
 Note that the conditional mean at each
 discrete interval is
 (AS) E [T-1 (Tf(n+l)T -TfnT)IT"nTj
 where rQnT is the sigma algebra genera-
 ted by fiT Vi. This process is clearly
 Markovian. From (A2), the expected evolu-
 tion of the probability of intervention dur-
 ing T can also be written as a function of
 the expected evolution of market funda-
 mentals:
 (A6) 1( k(n+1) -)
 - T 7 knT) + 7T'(TknT)(Tk(n+)T -TknT)
 + o(r)
 where o(&) collects all terms that approach
 zero faster than r. Then, substituting (A6)
 and (A4) into (AS) and using the fact that,
 conditional upon no interventions,
 (T k(n+lTr-T knT ) = (Tf(nf+ I)T-TfT)
 the conditional mean can be written as
 (A7) E{T-'(-TZ(fn+l) + r)
 x [1- 1(GknT) - 1'(TknT)
 x ( Z(n+)T + Ir) + o( r) ITfln}
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 For starting fundamentals level .rnT = Xkn Tr
 taking the limit as r goes to zero gives
 (A8) lim E[r 'f(nf+l)T TfnfT)ITQflnI
 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~O'
 = /.L(11T( f,))-'7T'(ft) Uf2.f
 The conditional variance at each discrete
 time interval is
 (A9) E [r' (7fk7 -Tf(k-1)T) 2kk l k
 Substituting (A4) and (A6) into (A9) and
 taking limits, the conditional variance is
 given by
 (A10) lim E [rI (JTkT - 1)k ) k2kTI
 = [1-_(f)] L2.
 Next, defining a(f) = ,u[1 - I7T(f)] -
 7Tr(f)o-2, and b(f)=[1-7r(f)]o-2, and
 substituting the result into (A3) above yields
 the form of the diffusion (6). If one restricts
 IJ(f) to be continuous and differentiable
 with bounded first derivatives Vf E (f, f), it
 is straightforward to show that the regular-
 ity conditions for nonexplosion given in
 Daniel Stroock and Srinavasa Varadhan
 (1979) hold, and (6) is a diffusion process.
 APPENDIX B: DERIVATION OF THE
 DISTRIBUTION OF EQUATION (6)
 From Appendix A, write the diffusion
 process in equation (6) in the following form:
 df= a(f) dt + [b(f)] dz
 where
 a(f) -4[l - I(f)] - U2TV(f)
 b(f) -2[1_7r(f)].
 Then the Fokker-Planck forward equation
 proyides the transitional density for f E
 (f,f):
 (Bi) dp/ldt = (d2[b(f)f/ldf2)
 -(d[a(f)p(f)]/df)-
 For a stationary density, (dp/dt) = 0.
 Therefore, setting the left-hand side of (Bi)
 equal to zero and twice integrating implies
 (B2) p(f) =m(f)[CjM(f)+ C2]
 where
 m(f) = b(f)exp[- f[2a( ~)Ib( )] d;
 M(f) = exp[-I [2a( ;)/b( 4)] dg dw
 and where C1 and C2 are constants of inte-
 gration that guarantee the following condi-
 tions:
 (i) p(f) 2 0 Vf E (,f)
 (see e.g., Eugene Wong, 1964; Karlin and
 Taylor, 1981 pp. 219-21). Substituting for
 a(f) and b(f) yields
 (B3) p(f) = [(1- r(f))]exp{(2,.L/or2)f}
 x [c2 +cI fexp[ (2 /vQ)O ] d; ]
 For ,u = 0, the conditions above imply C1 = 0
 since the integral is not bounded for ; large.
 Condition (ii) implies that
 C2= f|[l-r(;)] d;
 giving the distribution
 p(f) = C2A1 -I(f)]-
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 When #0, the distribution is given by
 solving for C1 and C2 in (B3).
 APPENDIX C: CALCULATION OF
 INTERVENTION PROBABILITY
 AND ITS DERIVATIVE
 Table 2 reports implied estimates of
 probabilities of intervention and an esti-
 mated target level. The tests in Table 3 use
 estimates of the probabilities of interven-
 tion reported in Table 2. Also, the single-
 equation and joint-equation estimations in
 Table 4 use the form of the probability
 function to construct the likelihood func-
 tion. In all of these cases, the probability
 function in (13) was used to provide esti-
 mates. This appendix details the form of the
 probability function, IT*(x), and its deriva-
 tive, w*'(x).
 For wr*(x), first note that in equilibri-
 um, 7r*(x)=IT*(x(s))=IrS(s) as described
 in equations (12) and (12') in the text.
 The probability of intervention is wrs(s)=
 Pr(I, = -1) + Pr(It = 1). Taking the expo-
 nential of equations (13) and rearranging,
 the probabilities can be rewritten as
 (Cl) Pr(It=-1)
 exp(co + clst-)
 1+ exp(co + c,sts-) + exp(go + g1st- 1)
 and
 (C2) Pr(It =1)
 1 + exp(co + clst-1) + exp(go + g1st-1)
 Adding these probabilities together gives the
 probability of intervention as
 (C3) 7TS(s)
 1+ exp(co + c1st, 1)
 1+ exp(co + clst- 1 ) + exp(go + gst- 1)
 To calculate the derivative of the proba-
 bility, note that ir*'(x) = rs"(s(x))s'(x) =
 irS'(s(x))exp(x). Then, irS' is calculated by
 taking the first derivative of equation (C3):
 (C4) X
 (c1 - gl)exp(co + clst- )- g
 [1 + exp(co + clst- 1) + exp(go + glSt_ 1 )]
 Finally, setting the derivative in (C4) equal
 to zero, checking second-order conditions,
 and solving for the st-1 gives the level of
 the exchange rate with the lowest probabil-
 ity of intervention. The functional form of
 this exchange rate in terms of the parame-
 ters is given in equation (14) in the text, and
 the estimates are reported in Table 2 under
 the column "estimated target."
 APPENDIX D: PARAMETRIC ESTIMATION
 1. Krugman Model.-Svensson (1991)
 shows that the solution to the exchange rate
 is given by
 (D1) x = f + a 1 + Al exp(A1f)
 + A2 exp( A2f)
 where A1 and A2 are constants of integra-
 tion that depend upon two boundary condi-
 tions and the A1 are roots of the character-
 istic equation implied by these boundary
 conditions. The expected change in the ex-
 change rate is
 (D2) Et(xt +I- xt)
 =[XK(f) - f]/a
 = ,u + [Alexp(Alf) + A2exp(A2f)]/a.
 For the case when u =0 and bands are
 symmetric, this expression reduces to
 (D3) Et(xt+1-xt) =-sinh(Af)A
 where A = [aAcosh(Af)]-' and A =
 ( 2/a)/o-. The conditional variance is
(D4) Et(x1tc-hxt f 2
 =f 0[XK,(f)12
 = 'Gr2[j -A* cosh( Af)]2
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 where A* = 2aAA. To check for nonlinear-
 ities arising from target zones as well as to
 provide parameters for conducting the
 Monte Carlo experiments, equations (D3)
 and (D4) were estimated jointly with the
 variance of fundamentals assuming innova-
 tions to the variances are lognormally dis-
 tributed. Since a is not identified, the model
 was estimated for a = 1 and a = 3 to check
 for robustness.
 For this model, the estimates of the non-
 linear term, A, were typically close to zero
 and never significantly positive. The Monte
 Carlo experiments used estimates of ,u and
 o- and imposed the condition that f in the
 boundary condition A corresponds to the
 strongest value of the exchange rate over
 the period.
 2. OU Model.-The solution to the O-U
 estimates are given in Delgado and Dumas
 (1991) as
 (D5) Xou(f)
 =(f+ fpa)/(1+ pa)
 + A M[1/2 pa; 0.5; p(f0 _
 + A2M[(1 + pa)/2 pa; 1.5;
 P(f _ f)2/0-2]
 x 4-((fo - ff)/f/
 where M[ *; -I is the confluent hypergeo-
 metric function and A1 and A2 are again
 constants of integration. They show that
 under symmetric bands A1 = 0, and this
 solution reduces to
 (D6) Xou (f )
 = (f + fo pa)/(1 + pa)
 + A2M[(1 + pa)/2 pa; 1.5;
 Pfo-f) 2/co2J
 x Jj(fo - f)/ur
 For the parametric estimation, these non-
 linearities were treated as in the case of the
 Krugman nonlinearities. In this case, the
 expected change in the exchange rate is
 (D7) Et( xt+ - xt)
 = [Xou(f) -fl/a
 - P(f0 - f)/(1 + pa)
 + Aou Jp(f. -f)sinh(Af)
 where Aou = 2AA. This equation was esti-
 mated jointly with the variance of funda-
 mentals and the process of fundamentals
 given by
 (D8) ft+1-ft =-p(ft-fO) +et+1 *
 Similarly, the conditional variance is
 u' 2[Xbu(f)]2. Under the assumption that
 the nonlinearities of the O-U and the
 Krugman model are the same, this equation
 reduces to equation (D4).
 As with the Krugman model, the esti-
 mates of the nonlinearity parameter, A,
 were never significantly positive. The Monte
 Carlo experiments use the estimates of fo,
 o-, and p and impose the constraint that f
 in A corresponds to the target-zone bands.
 3. Intervention Model.-Although the
 intervention model does not have a closed-
 form solution, its form was approximated
 for estimation purposes using equation (10)
 and assuming ,u = 0:
 (D9) Et(xt+l- xt)
 = [X(f) -f]/a
 =-2ir *t(X)[X,(f)]2
 + ac.2(l-)X"(f).
 Treating the target-zone nonlinearities as in
 the Krugman model, this equation becomes
 (D10) Et(xt+l- xt)
 =-( 2ur*i (x) [1 -A* cosh( Af)]2
 - (ao2(1- IT)A*Asinh( Af).
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 Due to extreme multicollinearity between
 the first and second terms in (D10), the
 latter second-order terms were assumed to
 be zero. The conditional variance is
 (Dll) Et( xt+l1-xt)2
 = 02(1 -lT)[X'(f)]2
 = 0o2(1 -r) [1-A* cosh( Af)]2.
 Equations (D10) and (Dll) were estimated
 jointly with the conditional variance of fun-
 damentals:
 (D12) Et(ft+1 - ft) 2 = O'2(1 - W).
 As with the other models, the estimates of
 the target-band nonlinearity term, A, were
 not significantly positive in any of the cases.
 REFERENCES
 Cleveland, William and Devlin, Susan. "Locally
 Weighted Regression: An Approach to
 Regression Analysis by Local Fitting."
 Joumal of the American Statistical Associa-
 tion, September 1988, 83(403), pp.
 596-610.
 Delgado, Francisco and Dumas, Bernard.
 "Target Zones, Broad and Narrow," in
 Paul Krugman and Marcus Miller, eds.,
 Exchange rate targets and currency bands.
 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
 1992, pp. 35-58.
 Diebold, Frank X. and Nason, J. N. "Nonpara-
 metric Exchange Rate Prediction?" Jour-
 nal of Intemational Economics, May 1990,
 28(3/4), pp. 315-32.
 Dominguez, Kathryn M. "Market Responses
 to Coordinated Central Bank Interven-
 tion." Camegie-Rochester Conference Series
 on Public Policy, Spring 1990, 33, pp.
 121-64.
 Edison, Hali J. The effectiveness of central
 bank intervention:A survey of the post-1982
 literature, Special Papers in International
 Economics, No. 18. Princeton, NJ:
 Princeton University Printing Services,
 1993.
 Flood, Robert and Rose, Andrew. "Fixing Ex-
 change Rates: A Virtual Quest for Fun-
 damentals." Mimeo, University of Califor-
 nia, Berkeley, 1993.
 Froot, Kenneth A., and Obstfeld, Maurice. "Sto-
 chastic Process Switching: Some Simple
 Solutions." Econometrica, January 1991,
 59(1), pp. 241-50.
 Funabashi, Yoichi. Managing the dollar: From
 the Plaza to the Louvre, 2nd Ed., Washing-
 ton, DC: Institute for International Eco-
 nomics, 1989.
 Goodhart, Charles and Hesse, Thomas. "Central
 Bank Forex Intervention Assessed in
 Continuous Time." London School of
 Economics Financial Markets Group Dis-
 cussion Paper No. 123, July 1991.
 Karlin, S. and Taylor, H. M. A second course
 in stochastic processes. New York: Aca-
 demic Press, 1981.
 Klein, Michael and Lewis, Karen K. "Learning
 About Intervention Zones." Joumal of In-
 temational Economics, November 1993,
 35(3/4), pp. 275-95.
 Krugman, Paul. "Target Zones and Ex-
 change Rate Dynamics." Quarterly Joumal
 of Economics, August 1991, 106(3), pp.
 669-82.
 Lewis, Karen K. "Testing the Portfolio Bal-
 ance Model: A Multi-lateral Approach."
 Joumal of Intemational Economics, Febru-
 ary 1988, 24(1/2), pp. 109-27.
 . "Occasional Interventions to Tar-
 get Rates with a Foreign Exchange Appli-
 cation." National Bureau of Economic
 Research (Cambridge, MA) Working Pa-
 per No. 3398, July 1990.
 . "Are Foreign Exchange Interven-
 tion and Monetary Policy Related and
 Does It Really Matter?" Joumal of Busi-
 ness, April 1995, 68(2), 185-214.
 Maddala, G. S. Limited dependent and quali-
 tative variables in econometrics. Cam-
 bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.
 Meese, Richard and Rose, Andrew K. "Non-
 Linear, Nonparametric, Nonessential
 Exchange Rate Estimation." American
 Economic Review, May 1990 (Papers and
 Proceedings), 80(2), pp. 192-96.
 . "An Empirical Assessment of Non-
 linearities in Models of Exchange Rate
 Determination." Review of Economic
 Studies, May 1991, 58(3), pp. 603-19.
This content downloaded from 130.91.116.186 on Fri, 14 Jul 2017 16:33:33 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 VOL. 85 NO. 4 LEWIS: OCCASIONAL INTERVENTIONS TO TARGET RATES 715
 Mussa, Michael L. "A Model of Exchange
 Rate Dynamics." Joumal of Political Econ-
 omy, February 1982, 90(11), pp. 74-104.
 Nelson, Daniel B. "Arch Models as Diffusion
 Approximations." Joumal of Economet-
 rics, July/August 1990, 45(1/2), pp. 7-38.
 Rogoff, Kenneth. "On the Effects of Steril-
 ized Intervention: An Analysis of Weekly
 Data." Joumal of Monetary Economics,
 September 1984, 14(2), pp. 133-50.
 Stroock, Daniel W. and Varadhan, S. R.
 Srinivasa. Multidimensional diffusion pro-
 cesses. New York: Springer-Verlag, 1979.
 Svensson, Lars E. 0. "Target Zones and
 Interest Rate Variability." Joumal of In-
 temational Economics, August 1991,
 31(1/2), pp. 27-54.
 . "Recent Research on Exchange
 Rate Target Zones: An Interpretation."
 Journal of Economic Perspectives, Fall
 1992, 6(4), pp. 119-44.
 Wong, Eugene. "The Construction of a Class
 of Stationary Markoff Processes." Pro-
 ceedings of Symposia in Applied Mathemat-
 ics, Volume XVI. Providence, RI: Ameri-
 can Mathematical Society, 1964.
This content downloaded from 130.91.116.186 on Fri, 14 Jul 2017 16:33:33 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
